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Criminal Discovery
Albert C. Garber
INTRODUCTION
The Anglo-American system of jurisprudence is based upon the prem-
ise that truth will emerge from a contest between adverse parties before
an impartial tribunal. After each litigant has presented all the evidence
at his disposal and has, by cross-examination or otherwise, refuted or
destroyed his opponent's case, it is presumed that a court or jury will
be able to arrive at a proper decision.1 For such a system to work
properly, the adversaries should be relatively equal. If, however, the
material available to one liti-
gant is grossly superior to that
THE AUTHOR (B.A., New York University, which is available to his op-
LLB., University of Southern California) is a ponent, an imbalance will be
practicing attorney in Los Angeles, California.
He has written articles on criminal procedure created which could result in
for various legal periodicals, especially in the an erroneous decision.
area of criminal discovery. Mr. Garber is a To avoid such an error,
former President of the Criminal Courts Bar
Association and is a member of the State Bar ideally, every party to an action
Association of California. should have at his disposal,
prior to trial, all the evidence
available to all parties.
In recent years, tremendous strides have been made in the field of
civil discovery toward the ascertainment of this ideal. The federal courts
adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. This new system
was intended to accomplish the following results: (1) to give greater
assistance to the parties in ascertaining truth and in checking and pre-
venting perjury; (2) to provide an effective means of detecting and
exposing false, fraudulent, and sham claims and defenses; (3) to make
available, in a simple, convenient, and inexpensive way, the facts which
otherwise could not be proved without great difficulty; (4) to educate
the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their daims and
defenses, thereby encouraging settlements; (5) to expedite litigation;
(6) to safeguard against surprise; (7) to prevent delay; (8) to simplify
and narrow the issues; and (9) to expedite and facilitate both prepara-
tion and trial.2
Virtually every state has adopted similar procedural rules.' It was
1. JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION OF THE ALT & ABA [here-
inafter cited as JOINT COMM.], THE PROBLEM OF A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 2 (1961); ef.
Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 707, 312 P.2d 698, 699 (1957).
2. Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 376, 364 P.2d 266, 275 (1961).
3. See, e.g., CAL. STAT. ch. 1904 (1957).
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obviously the intent of the state legislatures to remove the "game" ele-
ment of trial preparation while still retaining the adversary nature of the
trial itself. One of the principal purposes of discovery was to eliminate
the sporting theory of litigation - surprise at the trial.4
Despite the overwhelming acceptance and approval of the civil dis-
covery statutes, federal and state courts have been loath to extend dis-
covery to the criminal field. Query:
Why do these principles not obtain in criminal cases? Indeed, there
are many reasons why a defendant in a criminal case is in greater need
of pre-trial disclosure than a civil defendant. The accused is often with-
out means, represented only by assigned counsel or a public defender.
He may be barred from fact-gathering efforts by the simple fact that
he is in custody. The police are usually the first at the scene of the
crime and, therefore, come into possession of most of the physical evi-
dence. The State is well-equipped with scientific detection apparatus
and trained investigators. In short, most criminal defendants are
brought to litigate with an adversary who has more fact-gathering re-
sources.a
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Under the inflexible rule of the common law, parties to an action
were incompetent as witnesses and no means were provided by which an
adverse party could be compelled to produce documents in his possession
for use by his opponent at the trial. It was to cure this defect that equity
established the remedy of discovery as ancillary to civil causes of action
at law. However, this was never extended to criminal cases,6 and pre-
trial discovery in the criminal field was denied almost without exception.
This universal opposition to criminal discovery was based on the
following arguments:
(1) Perjury, i.e., that discovery would lead to perjury and the
manufacture of false testimony.'
(2) Intimidation, i.e., that criminal discovery would lead to bribery
and intimidation of witnesses to give perjured testimony or to absent
themselves so that they would be unable to testify.'
(3) Lack of Mutuality, i.e., that criminal discovery would be a
"one way street" because the state could not compel the defendant to
reveal his information.'
4. Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 376, 364 P.2d 266, 275 (1961).
5. JOINT COMM., PAULSEN, THE PROBLEM OF DIScOVERY IN CRIMNAL CASES 4 (1961).
6. 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1859(g) (3d ed. 1940); People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme
Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927).
7. State ex rel. Robertson v. Steel, 117 Minn. 384, 135 N.W. 1128 (1912); State v. Tune,
13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953).
8. State v. Tune, supra note 7, at 210, 98 A.2d at 884.
9. Id. at 211-12, 98 A.2d at 885; State v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio St. 397, 424, 91 N.E. 186, 192
(1910).
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(4) Subversion of the Criminal Process, i.e., that discovery would
undermine the judicial process by giving the defendant insurmountable
advantages."0
It [i.e., a request to inspect grand jury minutes] is said to lie in discre-
tion, and perhaps it does, but no judge of this court has granted it, and
I hope none ever will Under our criminal procedure the accused has
every advantage. While the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge,
he need not disclose the barest outline of his defense. He is immune
from question or comment on his silence; he cannot be convicted
when there is the least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve.
Why in addition he should in advance have the whole evidence against
him to pick over at his leisure, and make his defense, fairly or foully,
I have never been able to see ... Our dangers do not lie in too little
tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has been always haunted by
the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What
we need to fear is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that
obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime."-
Actually, there is no basis for the claimed opposition to criminal
discovery on the theory that it would lead to perjury; this argument is
ethereal rather than real. Every change in procedure where disclosure
of the truth has been simplified has raised the specter of perjury to
frighten the legal profession and judiciary, but the development of the
law has shown these fears to be without any basis or foundation what-
soever.'2 Indeed, Justice Brennan maintains that liberal discovery far
from abetting, actually deters perjury and fabrication.3
Although it may be conceded that witnesses could possibly be in-
timidated, there is no actual evidence that this has occurred. Further,
since the granting of discovery is usually at the discretion of the trial
court, if any danger of intimidation appears in a particular case, the
court can deal with it by appropriate sanctions.14
Lack of mutuality and subversion of the criminal process presupposes
that the state and the accused are equal adversaries. Realistically, this
is an absurdity. 5 In the usual criminal case, when a crime has been
committed and reported, it is the state which first exerts force in the
10. United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
11. Ibid. (L. Hand, J.).
12. State v. Tune, 13 NJ. 203, 227, 98 A.2d 881, 894 (1953) (Justice Brennan's dissent
refers to the fear of perjury as "that old hobgoblin."); Sonderland, Scope and Method of Dis-
covery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863, 867 (1933) ("Perjury is one of the great bugaboos
of the.., law.").
13. Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH.
U.L.Q. 279, 291.
14. Id. at 292; Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 56, 90,
98-101 (1961).
15. Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. REv. 293, 305 (1960);
Garber, The Growth of Criminal Discovery, 1 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 3, 5 (1962); Goldstein, The
State and the Accused; Balance of Advantages in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149
(1960).
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gathering of evidence and then holds it under its exclusive control.' 6
The average defendant can rarely, if ever, approach the power and re-
sources of the prosecution. The prosecution has available an investigative
staff of its own. In addition, the state can rely upon the investigative
resources of various state, local, and federal agencies, such as the FBI, the
Treasury Department, etc. Thus, the state is in a far better position to
gather and evaluate the facts than is a defendant.
The defense attorney who seeks to protect his client's interest operates
at a tremendous disadvantage in trying to ascertain the facts.'" Usually,
he comes into the case entirely too late, whereas the prosecution has been
there from the beginning. Undoubtedly, the defendant has been ques-
tioned and jailed without counsel for some time prior to arraignment.
The police probably have obtained statements by way of admissions or
confessions (is not this a form of discovery?), and being first at the
scene of the crime, the police have had an opportunity to gather and
analyze evidence in the absence of any representative of the accused.
When defense counsel is finally obtained, it may be weeks or months
after the arrest. He will have a tremendous difficulty in gathering in-
formation. The accused will be of little help by the time he is inter-
viewed; he may have forgotten the details of what occurred. And hu-
man nature being what it is, he is likely to tell counsel a slanted story.
Even if defense counsel is in a position to investigate, he is not likely
to get any cooperation from the public, whereas it is "respectable" to co-
operate with the prosecution. 8 In sum, the social and economic in-
equalities that exist between the average accused and the state place the
accused at a considerable disadvantage. 9
In addition, recent developments in the law have seriously impinged
upon the privilege against self-incrimination. Fourteen states have stat-
utes which require the defendant to give pre-trial notice if he intends
to introduce evidence of an alibi.2" A number of states require advance
notice of intention to plead the defense of insanity." Washington has
16. Fletcher, supra note 15.
17. JOINT COMM., THE PROBLEM OF A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 3 (1961).
18. Id. at 3, 4.
19. Fletcher, supra note 15, at 305-16.
20. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 192-B (1956); IND. ANN. STAT. 55 9-1631 to -1633 (1956);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 777.18 (1958); MIcH. COMp. LAws 55 768.20.21 (1948); MINN.
STAT. ANN. 5 630.14 (1947); OHIO REV. CODE 5 2945.58; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, 5 585
(1951); S.D. CODE 5 34.2801 (1939); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-22-17 (1953); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, 55 6561, 6562 (1958); Wis. STAT. ANN. 5 955.07 (1957).
21. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 192 A (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. 5 43-1301 (1947); CAL.
PEN. CODE 5 1016; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 39-8-1 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 909.17
(1957); IND. ANN. STAT. 5 9-1701 (1956); McH. COMP. LAWS 5 768.20.21 (1948);
UTAH CODE ANN. 5 77-22-16 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, 55 6561, 6562 (1958);
WASH. REV. CODE 5 10.76.020 (1951).
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a statute which requires the prosecution and the defense to furnish a
list of the witnesses to be called.22
Query: Are not these statutes a form of pre-trial discovery by the
prosecution? What about the recent decisions which have actually granted
discovery motions to the prosecution?23 Do not these statutes and de-
cisions indicate that whenever a strong state interest conflicts with the
privilege against self-incrimination, the privilege must surrender some
of its force?2"
In answering Judge Learned Hand's observation that the accused in
a criminal case has every advantage and that the granting of discovery to
an accused would subvert the criminal process, Professor Goldstein of
Yale has stated that if there is a subversion of the criminal process, it
is in favor of the prosecution.25 He points out that, increasingly, the
prosecution is being freed from restrictions on pleading and proof; in-
dictments are becoming more "elastic."2 6  This leaves a great oppor-
tunity for "surprise" at trial.27 The element of surprise can only be
eliminated by the development of adequate pre-trial discovery procedures
which will lessen the inequality that exists between the accused and the
state.2" In recognition of this problem, more and more of our state
courts are beginning to grant an accused the right to pre-trial discovery.2"
The remainder of this article will deal with various aspects of the prob-
lems of criminal discovery, with emphasis on the trend toward greater
liberality.
GRAND JURY MINUTES
Grand jury minutes traditionally have been denied to an accused.3"
An accused who sought to secure the disclosure of grand jury testimony
has had to overcome not only the generally expressed common-law rule
22. WASH. REv. CODE § 10.37.03 (1951); In Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal
Cases, 12 STAN. L. REV. 293, 316, Professor Fletcher points out that in practice the Wash-
ington statute is rarely observed by the defendant since there is no provision for the sanction
of exclusion of an unlisted witness' testimony.
23. Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919 (1962); McCann v. Superior
Court, 184 Cal. App. 2d 813, 7 Cal. Repr. 841 (1960).
24. See Comment, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 135, 136-38 (1963).
25. Goldstein, The State and the Accused; Balance of Advantages in Criminal Procedure,
69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960).
26. Id. at 1173.
27. Id. at 1180.
28. Id. at 1172-98. See also Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest
for Truth?, 1963 WAsH. U.L.Q. 279, 291.
29. Garber, The Growth of Criminal Discovery, 1 AM. CRIM. LQ. 3 (1962). See People
v. Stokes, 24 Misc. 2d 755, 204 N.Y.S.2d 827, 831 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1960).
30. United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923); Pinana v. State, 76 Nev. 274,
352 P.24. 824 (1960); State v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio St. 397, 91 N.E. 186 (1910); State v.
Selby, 126 N.E.2d 606 (Ohio C.P. 1955); Angle v. State, 306 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Crim. App.
1957). See 6 WIGMOE , EvmiEcE § 1850 (3d ed. 1940); Orfield, The Federal Grand jury,
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against discovery in criminal cases,"' but he also has been faced with
the historical safeguards surrounding grand jury secrecy which have been
propounded to preclude disclosure of any testimony before the grand
jury32
The classically expressed values of grand jury secrecy have been sum-
marized as follows:
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be con-
templated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its
deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their
friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation
of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify before
the grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it;
(4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who
have information with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to
protect [an] innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the
fact that he has been under investigation, and from the expense of
standing trial where there was no probability of guilt.33
As Professor Louisell has commented,34 once an accused is indicted
and arrested, reasons (1) and (5) become inoperative. Reason (2)
does not stand analysis as an argument against discovery because it is not
disclosure of deliberation which is sought but testimony of witnesses.
And discovery, of course, is not possible until after the indictment is
rendered, when the chance to importune is gone. In reference to reason
(3), the furnishing of a defendant with a basis for preparation of per-
jured testimony has little or no validity. If an accused will engage in
22 F.R.D. 343 (1959). In Grady, Discovery in Criminal Cases, 1959 U. ILL. L.F. 835, the
author states that an Illinois defendant has no right to pre-trial inspection of the grand jury
transcript. He indicates that there are very few reported cases and none of them indicate that
the matter is even within the discretion of the trial court. Presumably, it is discretionary
since no statute prohibits inspection by the defendant. See Note, Discovery in Criminal Pro-
ceedings, 13 U. FLA. L. REv. 242 (1960), wherein the commentator points out that a tradi-
tional cloud of secrecy normally renders grand jury testimony non-discoverable. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 905.27 (1959) provides that grand jury testimony need not be disclosed "'except
when required by a court to disclose the testimony of a witness examined before the grand
jury for the purpose of ascertaining whether it is consistent with that of the witness given
before the court, or to disclose the testimony given before the grand jury by any person upon
a charge against such person for perjury in giving his testimony or upon trial therefor, or
when permitted by the court in furtherance of justice." The notewriter summarizes the Flor-
ida decisions as prohibiting a defendant from examining grand jury testimony except when
perjury or subornation of perjury is involved. Despite the language of the statute, which
permits discovery at the court's discretion, in the light of the procedures in the leading cases,
grand jury testimony is virtually unattainable in Florida. See Gordon v. State, 104 So. 2d
524 (Fla. 1958); Trafficante v. State, 92 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1957); State ex rel. Brown v.
Dewell, 123 Fla. 785, 167 So. 687 (1936); Minton v. State, 107 So. 2d 143 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1958), ajf'd, 113 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1959).
31. People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927).
32. Note, Criminal Discovery - The State of the Law, 6 UTAH L. REv. 531, 538 (1959).
33. United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954), citing United States v. Am-
azon Indus. Chem. Corp., 55 F.2d 254, 261 (D.C. Md. 1931); cf. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.
v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 405 (1960). See also LOUISELL, MODERN CALIFORNIA
DiscovBRY 338, 389 (1963).
34. LIOUISELL, supra note 33 at 789.
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such unlawful machinations, the time element will have little effect;
other processes of law must cope with such unlawful conduct. 35 Reason
(4) likewise is without merit since a person who testifies before the
grand jury can anticipate that he will be a future witness.36
In other words, the necessity for secrecy is a mere shibboleth. More
and more states are becoming aware of the fundamental unfairness of
denying an accused the information produced before the grand jury on
the sacred grounds of secrecy." As the Utah court stated after taking
cognizance of the grand jury's activities and the alleged necessity for
secrecy:
On the other hand the rights of one accused of crime are in no wise to
be belittled nor ignored. The fundamental purpose of criminal trial
is not solely to convict the accused. It is to seek the truth and ad-
minister justice. While secrecy may be justified at certain stages of
the proceedings ... all fair-minded persons will concede that ultimately
the full truth should be revealed to the Court and Jury. In such in-
stances the truism should be recognized that the truth should have
nothing to fear from light.38
Four states provide that the minutes of grand jury hearings shall be
transcribed, the accused being provided with a copy of the transcript."
The traditional dire dangers predicted from the disclosure of grand jury
testimony have not occurred in these states. It is submitted, therefore,
that the experience which has been gained in these states clearly indicates
that the dangers of disclosure of grand jury testimony are seriously over-
rated.4"
In a number of the states which do not have specific statutes provid-
ing for a transcript of the minutes, it usually is held that the granting
of such discovery is within the discretion of the trial court."
Where grand jury minutes are not obtainable by statute, the accused
is not entitled as a matter of right to be furnished with evidence taken
by the grand jury in support of the indictment.42 A presumption exists
that an indictment is based upon legal and sufficient evidence until there
35. State v. Faux, 9 Utah 2d 350, 351, 345 P.2d 186, 187 (1959).
36. Id. at 353, 345 P.2d at 188.
37. Missouri ex rel. Clagett v. James, 327 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. 1959); State v. Moffa, 64 N.J.
Super. 69, 165 A.2d 219 (Super. Ct. 1960); People v. Stokes, 24 Misc. 2d 755, 204 N.Y.S.2d
827 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1960).
38. State v. Faux, 9 Utah 2d 350, 354-55, 345 P.2d 186, 188-89 (1959).
39. CAL PEN. CODE § 938.1; IOWA CODE ANN. § 772.4 (1950); Ky. CRiM. CODE § 110
(1959); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 628.04 (1953).
40. 48 CALi'. L REv. 160, 161 (1960).
41. People v. Stokes, 24 Misc. 2d 755, 204 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1960); People v.
Quinn, 24 Misc. 2d 111, 201 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Oneida County Ct. 1960).
42. People v. Meehan, 30 Misc. 2d 659, 219 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Sup. Ct. 1961); People v. Carde,
28 Misc. 2d 733, 218 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Orleans County Ct. 1961), etr'd, 11 N.Y.2d 279, 183
NE.2d 651 (1962).
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is satisfactory proof to the contrary.43 The granting of a right to inspec-
tion of such minutes rests in the court's sound discretion.44 The court
can not surmise and conjecture that the evidence before the grand jury
was insufficient or illegal. Rather, facts must be set forth in the moving
papers on which the court, using its discretion, can act.45 The evidence
before the grand jury should be disclosed only where the court finds that
the application rests on proven facts. 6 The principles enunciated herein
certainly do not indicate any tremendous break-through in the field of
criminal discovery. But, they do indicate that the courts are becoming
increasingly aware of the problem. As stated in a recent New York case,
"It is likely, and perhaps inevitable, that the presently evolving practice
of liberal discovery in criminal cases may ultimately lead to the automatic
granting of discovery . .. .""
CONFESSIONS AND STATEMENTS OF THE ACCUSED
The right of an accused to obtain a pre-trial examination of his own
admissions or confession has always been denied to defendants in the
federal courts.4" This traditional view has been followed in many juris-
dictions; it is based on the erroneous idea that examining one's own con-
fession will enable a defendant to fabricate explanations for his state-
ments.4" All of the traditional arguments which have been used to
oppose the growth and development of criminal discovery have been used
to prevent an accused from obtaining copies of his own statements."0
Although this traditional view has been followed in numerous juris-
dictions, more and more states are beginning to permit inspection and
examination of a defendant's own statements.5 Courts are increasingly
43. People v. Glen, 173 N.Y. 395, 403, 66 N.E. 112, 115 (1903); People v. Quinn, 24
Misc. 2d 111, 112, 201 N.Y.S.2d 582, 584 (Oneida County Ct. 1961).
44. People v. Bolivar, 146 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
45. People v. O'Keefe, 198 Misc. 682, 684, 99 N.Y.S.2d 895, 897 (Broome County Ct.
1950).
46. People v. Dally, 174 Misc. 830, 832, 21 N.Y.S.2d 774, 776 (Sup. Ct. 1940); People v.
Quinn, 24 Misc. 2d 111, 112, 201 N.Y.S.2d 582, 584 (Oneida County Ct. 1961); People v.
McCann, 166 Misc. 269, 270, 2 N.Y.S.2d 216, 218 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1938).
47. People v. Stokes, 24 Misc. 2d 755, 760, 204 N.Y.S.2d 827, 833 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1960).
48. Kaufman, Criminal Discovery and Inspection of Defendants Own Statements in the Fed-
eral Courts, 57 COLuM. L. REV. 1113 (1957); Orfield, Discovery and Inspection in Federal
Criminal Procedure, 59 W. VA. L. REv. 221, 242 (1957).
49. Rosier v. People, 126 Colo. 82, 247 P.2d 448 (1952); State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98
A.2d 881 (1953); State v. Sharp, 162 Ohio St. 173, 122 N.E.2d 684 (1954).
50. Comment, 6 UTAH L. REV. 531, 535 (1957).
51. Arizona: State ex rel. Polly v. Superior Court, 81 Ariz. 127, 302 P.2d 263 (1956).
Louisiana: State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So. 2d 273 (1945) (the only state which un-
equivocally states that the denial of pre-trial inspection of defendant's conversation in a mur-
der case constitutes a denial of due process). Maryland: State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 51 A.2d
647 (1947); MD. ANN. CODE, Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 5 (1952). Michigan:
People v. Johnson, 97 N.W.2d 739 (Mich. 1959). New Jersey: State v. Johnson, 28 N.J.
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recognizing that in the conduct of a criminal case, a defendant is en-
titled to the "fundamental requirement of fairness."52 An essential right
included within this proposition is the right of a defendant to prepare his
defense. Obviously, in view of the often crucial role of a confession in
a criminal trial, pre-trial examination of a defendant's statements may
be the most important aspect of the whole case.5"
Perhaps the leading case which enunciates the importance of the
right of a defendant to a confession is State v. Johnson.54 Chief Justice
Weintraub of New Jersey, in a masterful opinion, declared that in a
prosecution for murder, the defendant is entitled to inspect any statements
or confessions taken from him which would be offered at the trial. After
pointing out that truth is best revealed by a decent opportunity to prepare
in advance of trial, Chief Justice Weintraub stated:
We must be mindful of the role of confession. It frequently becomes
the core of the State's case. It is not uncommon for the judicial pro-
ceeding to become more of a review of what transpired at headquarters
than a trial of the basic criminal event itself. No one would deny a
defendant's right thoroughly to investigate the facts of the crime to pre-
pare for trial of that event. When a confession is given and issues
surrounding it tend to displace the criminal event as the focus of the
trial, there should be like opportunity to get at the facts of the sub-
stituted issue. Simple justice requires that a defendant be permitted to
prepare to meet what thus looms as the critical element of the case
against him. 55
One must bear in mind that a confession is ordinarily obtained in a
tension filled atmosphere and a setting designed by the authorities. A
statement obtained under such circumstances may not always reflect
accurately the true picture of the events at the scene of the crime.56
Under such circumstances, "there seems to be a measure of elemental jus-
tice in permitting one accused of crime to see a confession alleged to
have been made by him, which he expects to be produced against him
133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958); State v. Moffa, 64 N.J. Super. 69, 165 A.2d 219 (Super. Ct.
1960). New York: People v. Stokes, 24 Misc. 2d 755, 204 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Ct. Gen. Sess.
1960). Washington: State v. Thompson, 54 Wash. 2d 100, 338 P.2d 319 (1959). In Cali-
fornia, beginning with Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 312 P.2d 698 (1957), there
has been a dynamic growth in the scope of criminal discovery. See Cash v. Superior Court,
53 Cal. 2d 72, 346 P.2d 407 (1959); People v. Cartier, 51 Cal. 2d 590, 335 P.2d 114
(1959); Vance v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 92, 330 P.2d 773 (1958); McCarty v. Superior
Court, 162 Cal. App. 2d 755, 328 P.2d 819 (1958); Schindler v. Superior Court, 161 Cal.
App. 2d 513, 327 P.2d 68 (1958); Cordry v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 2d 267, 326
P.2d 222 (1958).
52. Roviaro v. United States, 335 U.S. 53, 61 (1957).
53. People v. Stokes, 24 Misc. 2d 755, 204 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Ct Gen. Sess. 1960).
54. 28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958).
55. Id. at 137, 145 A.2d at 316.
56. People v. Stokes, 24 Misc. 2d 755, 759, 204 N.Y.S.2d 827, 832-33 (Ct. Gen. Sess.
1960).
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at his trial."57  The notion that the prosecution has some vested tactical
interest in withholding a defendant's statement, the details of which he
may not recall, so that it may be "sprung" upon him at the trial, is a
form of "trial by ambush."58  It is a practice which is inconsistent with
the modern and enlightened concepts of the goal of a trial - the ac-
curate ascertainment of the facts.59
In line with this liberal trend toward greater discovery, Illinois has
adopted a statute which provides that "no... confession shall be received
in evidence which has not been furnished [to defendant upon his motion]
... unless... the prosecutor was unaware... of the confession . 6...0"
Minnesota also has adopted a statute which precludes the admission in
evidence of any confession or statement of which the accused has not been
furnished a copy.6 Maryland has adopted a procedural rule similar to
federal rule 16 but with the addition of the phrase: "including written
statements by the defendant."6  Although virtually all of these cases in
states allowing a defendant to examine his confession and/or admission"
seem to indicate that permission to examine the statements lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court, it is possible that discovery will go
much further in reference to confessions.64 A New York court indicated:
It is likely, and perhaps inevitable, that the presently evolving practice
of liberal discovery in criminal cases may ultimately lead to the auto-
matic granting of discovery of a defendant's written statement in the
absence of showing of prejudice to the People.65
The most significant growth of criminal discovery in any state has
been that of the state of California.66 As late as 1956, discovery was
denied at both the trial and the appellate court level on the ground that
it was beyond the court's jurisdiction. In 1957, in the landmark case
of Powell v. Superior Court," a defendant who was indicted for em-
bezzlement of public funds sought to inspect and copy his signed state-
ments made in the police chief's office. He also wanted to obtain a
typewritten transcript of a tape recording made there several days later.
57. State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 76, 51 A.2d 647, 653 (1947).
58. State v. Thompson, 54 Wash. 2d 100, 109, 338 P.2d 319, 324 (1959).
59. People v. Stokes, 24 Misc. 2d 755, 759, 204 N.Y.S.2d 827, 833 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1960).
60. ILL. CODE OF CalM. P. 5 114-10 (1963).
61. MINN. STAT. § 611.033 (Supp. 1963).
62. MD. R. CRIM. P. 5.
63. See cases cited note 51 supra.
64. People v. Stokes, 24 Misc. 2d 755, 760, 204 N.Y.S.2d 827, 833 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1960).
65. Ibid.
66. Garber, The Growth of Criminal Discovery, 1 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 3, 18 (1962).
67. 48 Cal. 2d 704, 312 P.2d 698 (1957). This decision was preceded by People v. Riser,
47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956), which was the first California case to permit criminal
discovery at trial.
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The Supreme Court of California issued a writ of mandamus to compel
the trial court to order the pre-trial inspection of the documents, stating:
In the circumstances of the present case, to deny inspection of de-
fendant's statements would likewise be to lose sight of the objective of
ascertainment of the facts, and would be out of harmony with the policy
of this state that the goal of criminal prosecutions is not to secure a
conviction in every case by any expedient means, however odious, but
rather, only through establishing the truth upon a public trial fair to
defendant and the state alike.68
Since the landmark Powell decision, the growth of discovery in
reference to a defendant's right to inspect his own statements has been
phenomenal. It is now settled in California that a defendant has the
right to inspect his own statements made to the police, whether signed,
recorded, transcribed, or merely in the form of notes.6" Further, the
California cases have stated that the defendant's right is not dependent
upon the admissibility of the statement." The defendant does not have
to show that he cannot recall the facts; all that he must indicate is that
he does not recall the contents of the statements made to the investigat-
ing officers or other law enforcement officials at the time that the state-
ments were taken.7' When a proper showing is made, the trial court
does not have discretion to deny a motion for discovery.72
Only one state, Louisiana, has held that the denial of inspection of a
confession constitutes denial of due process.73 It is foreseeable, however,
that more and more courts will adopt this position, despite the fact that
the United States Supreme Court has held that denial of discovery does
not constitute a violation of due process.74
STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES
AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
The traditional view concerning the right of a defendant to inspect
statements of witnesses or documents in the hands of the prosecution has
always been that such statements and documents are not discoverable. At
common law and in most of the states, in the absence of statute, in-
spection of statements or documents of prospective witnesses has been
denied.75 The reasons for denying an accused the right to inspect such
68. Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 707, 312 P.2d 698, 699-700 (1957).
69. Funk v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 423, 340 P.2d 593 (1959).
70. People v. Silberstein, 159 Cal. App. 2d 848, 323 P.2d 591 (1958).
71. Vance v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 92, 330 P.2d 773 (1958).
72. People v. Chapman, 52 Cal. 2d 95, 338 P.2d 428 (1959); McAllister v. Superior Court,
165 Cal. App. 2d 297, 331 P.2d 654 (1958).
73. State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So. 2d 273 (1945).
74. Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
75. Comment, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 187. See People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245
N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927).
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statements or documents were the traditional objections which have al-
ways been raised, i.e., to prevent the subornation of perjury or the fabri-
cation of phoney defenses.76
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ostensibly provided for a
broad basis of discovery of witnesses' statements or documents in the
hands of the prosecution. Rule 16 provides as follows:
Upon motion of a defendant at any time after the filing of the indict-
ment or information, the court may order the attorney for the govern-
ment to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph desig-
nated books, papers, documents or tangible objects, obtained from or
belonging to the defendant or obtained from others by seizure or by
process, upon a showing that the items sought may be material to the
preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable ....
A number of states have adopted statutes patterned after the federal
rules which permit limited discovery of documentary evidence at the
discretion of the trial court.7" Generally, such statutes were construed
by both the state and federal courts to exclude pre-trial statements of
witnesses."
Then, in 1957, the case of Jencks v. United States"9 was decided.
Jencks, a union official, was accused of false swearing. The govern-
ment's case rested on the testimony of two undercover agents. These
agents indicated that they had made reports to the FBI, and the defendant
sought, by appropriate motion, to inspect these reports. The trial court
denied inspection. The Supreme Court held this withholding of the
reports to be error and stated that the defendant was entitled to inspect
all the reports of the undercover agents touching on matters as to which
the agents testified. The impact of the Jencks decision was tremen-
dous."° Dire predictions were made to the effect that the decision would
seriously hamper the activities of the FBI, and within a matter of months
Congress passed the so-called Jencks Act."' As interpreted by Palermo v.
76. People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, supra note 75; Urga v. State, 104 So. 2d 43,
44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Commonwealth v. Wable, 332 Pa. 80, 14 A.2d 334 (1955).
77. FED. R. CIM. P. 7 (f) provides for a bill of particulars, but this has very limited prac-
tical value since the granting of a bill of particulars is completely discretionary. Rule 15
provides for depositions, but this is not a true discovery procedure and is only applicable
where the witness is leaving the jurisdiction and is unable to attend the trial. Rule 17 author-
izes the production of books, etc. by subpoena duces tecum and gives the court discretion to
direct their production, but, in practice, the courts limit the scope of this rule very narrowly.
78. Note, 13 U. FLA. L. REv. 242 (1960); Comment, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 187.
79. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
80. Comment, The Aftermath of the Jencks Case, 11 STAN. L. REV. 297 (1959).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1957): "Demands for production of statements and reports of wit-
nesses.
"(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or report
in the possession of the United States which was made by a Government witness or prospec-
tive Government witness (other than the defendant) to an agent of the Government shall be
the subject of subpoena, discovery or inspection until said witness has testified on direct ex-
amination in the trial of the case.
"(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination, the
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United States,82 the United States Supreme Court determined that the
Jencks Act provides the exclusive measure of discoverability of govern-
ment witnesses' statements. The Palermo case enunciates the following
set of principles with reference to inspection of statements: (1) inspec-
tion is not permitted until the witness has testified on direct examination;
(2) no discovery is permitted of the government's resum6s, summaries,
or condensations of the witnesses' statements; (3) production of the
papers, documents, etc. is made to the judge who excises portions not
relevant to the subject matter of the testimony before delivering them to
the defendant; (4) if the government elects, the case is not to be dis-
missed, but is to continue with the direct testimony of the witness
stricken, unless the court grants a mistrial. This narrow interpretation
considerably limits the language of the Jencks Act. Although the statute
is positively phrased in terms of giving a right to the defendant, its
effect is largely negative because all "statements" do not come within the
technical requirements of the act; and unless they meet the technical re-
quirements as interpreted by the Palermo case, such "statements" are un-
available to the defendant.'
court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any statement (as
hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the United States which relates to
the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the entire contents of any such
statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order it
to be delivered directly to the defendant for his examination and use.
"(c) If the United States claims that any statement ordered to be produced under this
section contains matter which does not relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the
witness, the court shall order the United States to deliver such statement for the inspection
of the court in camera. Upon such delivery the court shall excise the portions of such state-
ment which do not relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness. With such
material excised, the court shall then direct delivery of such statement to the defendant for
his use. If, pursuant to such procedure, any portion of such statement is withheld from the
defendant and the defendant objects to such withholding, and the trial is continued to an ad-
judication of the guilt of the defendant, the entire text of such statement shall be preserved by
the United States and, in the event the defendant appeals, shall be made available to the
appellate court for the purpose of determining the correctness of the ruling of the trial judge.
Whenever any statement is delivered to a defendant pursuant to this section, the court in its
discretion, upon application of said defendant, may recess proceedings in the trial for such
time as it may determine to be reasonably required for the examination of such statement by
said defendant and his preparation for its use in trial.
"(d) If the United States elects not to comply with an order of the court under paragraph
(b) or (c) hereof to deliver to the defendant any such statement or such portion thereof as
the court may direct, the court shall strike from the record the testimony of the witness, and
the trial shall proceed unless the court in its discretion shall determine that the interests of
justice require that a mistrial be declared.
"(e) The term 'statement' as used in subsections (b), (c) and (d) of this section in rela-
tion to any witness called by the United States, means - (1) A written statement made by
said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him; or (2) A stenographic,
mechanical, electrical or other recording or a transcription thereof which is substantially ver-
batim recital of an oral statement made by said witness to an agent of the Government and
recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral statement."
82. 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
83. See Comment, 1961 U. ILL. LF. 187, 193, wherein the commentator points out that in
the case of People v. Wolff, 19 M1. 2d 318, 167 N.E.2d 197, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 874 (1960),
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A number of states, in line with the trend toward more liberal crim-
inal discovery, have begun to permit inspection of such statements and/or
documents.8" The value of obtaining such statements, particularly wherc
they were made before time dulled the memory of the witness, is obvious.
Such statements may contain contradictions of the testimony of the wit-
ness, may omit some facts related by the witness at the trial, or may
reveal a contrast in the emphasis placed on the same facts.8 5 As stated
in the case of People v. Rosario :8
A pre-trial statement of a witness for the prosecution is valuable not just
as a source of contradictions with which to confront him and discredit
his trial testimony. Even statements seemingly in harmony with such
testimony may contain matter which will prove helpful on cross-examina-
tion. They may reflect a witness' bias, for instance, or otherwise supply
the defendant with knowledge essential to the neutralization of the
damaging testimony of the witness which might, perhaps, turn the scales
in his favor. Shades of meaning, stress, additions or omissions may
be found which will place the witness' answers upon direct examination
in an entirely different light.87
The appellate courts of California have enunciated most clearly the
right of an accused to inspect and/or copy the statements of eye wit-
nesses, victims, police officers, etc., in the hands of the prosecution, or
to examine documents which the prosecution controls."8 The right of
inspection is not limited by the fact that the statement is unsigned or
unacknowledged. 9 The sole test to determine admissibility of such state-
ments or documents is a simple one - will it lead to ascertainment
of the facts. ° But "blanket" requests for information will be denied.9 In
the Illinois court expressly adopted the rule of the Jencks Act. Cf. People v. Moses, 11 Ill.
2d 84, 142 N.E.2d 1 (1957).
84. Layman v. State, 355 P.2d 444 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960). This case illustrates the ex-
treme importance of the production of this type of evidence. The defendant was charged
with obtaining money from the state by false pretenses for construction projects. The bases
of the accusation against the defendant were too highly technical scientific engineering reports
which had taken many months to prepare. The court granted the motion for inspection
and pointed out that to deny the same would be to place an unbearable burden upon counsel
for the defense at the time of trial; special, highly technical and scientific data would require
analysis by scientists rather than lawyers. People v. McCallum, 13 App. Div. 2d 31, 213
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 830 (1962), involved a larceny charge in
which the defendant's sobriety was a primary issue. The court held that the original police
report should have been discoverable. People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448,
173 N.E.2d 881 (1961), involved a felony-murder arising out of a robbery in which the
defendant sought to examine statements of the prosecuting witnesses. The court granted the
motion.
85. People v. Chapman, 52 Cal. 2d 95, 338 P.2d 428 (1959).
86. 9 N.Y.2d 286, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448, 173 N.E.2d 883 (1961).
87. Id. at 289, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 450, 173 N.E.2d at 883.
88. Garber, The Growth of Criminal Discovery, 1 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 3, 21 (1962).
89. Funk v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 423, 340 P.2d 593 (1959).
90. People v. Chapman, 52 Cal. 2d 95, 338 P.2d 428 (1959); People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d
566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 930 (1957), appeal dismissed, 358 U.S. 646
(1959); Brenard v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. App. 2d 314, 341 P.2d 743 (1959); People v.
Silberstein, 159 Cal. App. 2d 848, 323 P.2d 591 (1958).
91. People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 2d 755, 349 P.2d 964 (1960).
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an appropriate criminal case, it is not only the right, but the duty of an
attorney for a defendant to demand such statements and documents in
the hands of the prosecution that are material to the defendant's case."'
DEPOSITIONS
It generally has been held that there was no common-law right to
take depositions in criminal cases.9" In the absence of specific statutes,
the courts do not have the power to compel a witness to submit to a
deposition in a criminal case." The few statutes which provide for depo-
sitions are not really discovery statutes, but rather are "perpetuation"
statutes.
5
Even in those states which have adopted the liberal civil discovery
rules patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, depositions are
limited to civil, not criminal, cases.9" For all practical purposes, deposi-
tions are not available in criminal trials. 7
REAL OR TANGIBLE EVIDENCE
The traditional common-law view prohibits the right of discovery of
real or tangible evidence in the hands of the prosecution. However,
there has been a significant trend away from this limited view. It has
become increasingly apparent that the usual arguments for denying
discovery" cannot reasonably be applied to this type of evidence. The
defendant who acquires knowledge of blood testsi ballistic findings,
chemical analyses, etc. has little resulting opportunity to create a false
defense, suborn perjury, or alter the evidence.0 ° A greater number of
states are beginning to permit an accused to examine real or tangible
evidence in the hands of the prosecution,"' and there are indications that
92. Vetter v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. App. 2d 132, 10 Cal. Repr. 890 (1961).
93. Clark v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 2d 739, 12 Cal. Repr. 191 (1961).
94. IbMd.
95. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 (a) (involving witnesses leaving the jurisdiction and unable to at-
tend trial); MD. RULES 727; CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1335-36.
96. Ex parte Denton, 266 Ala. 279, 96 So. 2d 296 (1957); Clark v. Superior Court, 190
Cal. App. 2d 739 (1961); Reed v. Allen, 121 Vt. 202, 153 A.2d 74 (1959); State v. Chris-
tenson, 40 Wash. 2d 329, 242 P.2d 755 (1952).
97. An obvious problem that is presented when dealing with the topic of criminal deposi-
tion is, of course, the right of confrontation.
98. People v. Walker, 126 Colo. 135, 248 P.2d 287 (1952); State v. Martinez, 220 La. 899,
57 So. 2d 888, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 843 (1952); People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court,
245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927).
99. See notes 7-11 supra and accompanying text.
100. Note, 6 UTAH L. RV. 531, 538 (1959).
101. Arizona: State ex rel. Mahoney v. Superior-Court, 78 Ariz. 74, 275 P.2d 887 (1954).
California: Brenard v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. App. 2d 314, 341 P.2d 743 (1959); Norton
v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 2d 133, 343 P.2d 139 (1959); Schindler v. Superior Court,
161 Cal. App. 2d 513, 327 P.2d 68 (1958); Walker v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 2d
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several others will permit the accused to examine chemical findings,
criminal identification reports, blood tests, ballistic tests, etc. in an ap-
propriate situation." 2 Inspection of tangible evidence is provided for
at the federal level within the strict limitations set forth in the stat-
ute." 3 Discovery is limited to papers and objects obtained from or
belonging to the defendant or secured from others by seizure or by
process. °4
The criminal codes of six states provide for the discovery of tangible
evidence in criminal prosecutions.0 5 The Florida statute provides:
When . . . the evidence of the state shall relate to ballistics, finger-
prints, blood, semen, or other stains, or documents, papers, books, ac-
counts, letters, photographs, objects or other tangible things, upon mo-
tion showing good cause therefor, and upon notice to the prosecuting
attorney, the court ... may order the state to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing... of any designated papers,
books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or other tangible things.106
Despite the broad language of the statute, it has been narrowly in-
terpreted.' ° A broad interpretation would better serve the ends of
justice.
CONCLUSION
Since the purpose of a criminal trial is to ascertain the facts from the
material at hand, the revelation of such facts prior to trial will aid toward
the realization of that goal. Our whole system concerning the adminis-
tration of justice is based on the assumption that the adversary proceed-
ing, wherein the parties to an action are responsible for developing the
facts before an impartial tribunal, is best suited to develop the truth.
The recent developments in the field of civil discovery have clearly
shown that pre-trial disclosure and inspection fosters a more thorough
development of the facts at the trial by reducing the elements of con-
134, 317 P.2d 130 (1957). Illinois: People v. Buzan, 351 Ill. 610, 184 N.E. 890 (1933);
People v. Gerold, 265 Ill. 448, 107 N.E. 165 (1914). Oklahoma: State ex rel. Sadler v.
Lackey, 319 P.2d 610 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957). Pennsylvania: In re Di Joseph Petition,
394 Pa. 19, 145 A.2d 187 (1958). Washington: State v. Thompson, 54 Wash. 2d 100,
338 P.2d 319 (1959). Contra, Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Evans, 190 Pa. Super. 179,
154 A.2d 57 (1959); Commonwealth v. Gockley, 411 Pa. 437, 192 A.2d 693 (1963).
102. State ex rel. Keast v. District Court, 135 Mont. 545, 342 P.2d 1071 (1959); State v.
Lavalle, 122 Vt. 75, 163 A.2d 856 (1960).
103. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
104. United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367 (D.D.C. 1954).
105. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2010 (1947); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 909-18 (1959); IDAHo
CODE ANN. § 19-1530 (Supp. 1963); MD. RULES 728; Mo. RULES § 25.19 (1959); N.J.
RULES 2:5-8 (c).
106. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 925.04 (Supp. 1933).
107. Note, Discovery in Criminal Proceedings, 13 U. FLA. L. REV. 242 (1960).
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cealment and surprise. Concealment and surprise were typical at com-
mon-law trials and are still too prominent in today's criminal proceed-
ings. It is difficult to comprehend why in criminal actions, where de-
fendants are subject to loss of liberty or life, discovery procedures lag
far behind those that have been developed in civil actions.
Fortunately, a growing awareness has developed during the past
decade of the necessity to permit an accused in a criminal action to
obtain discovery and inspection to balance the social and economic in-
equalities that exist between an accused and the state in the fact finding
process, %.e., the trial. It is submitted that when this inherent inequality
is reduced, a fairer trial will result and the administration of justice will
be better served.
